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The corporate meltdowns of this and the previous decade in the US - WorldCom, Enron, Tyco, and in Australia - FAI, HIH and AWB being among the many examples - have resulted in the governments of those two countries introducing legislation and policy guidelines aimed at minimising future corporate misbehaviour. 

The US has introduced the Sarbanes Oxley Act, with requirements on corporate accountants and auditors, as well as its whistleblowing provisions. It has revised the Federal Sentencing Guidelines for Organizations. New rules for the NYSE and NASDAQ have also been introduced. In addition, the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission and U.S. Department of Justice have further strengthened the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act 1977, last revised in 1997.

Australia has revised the Corporations Act to include whistleblower protection clauses as well as adopted the ASX Corporate Governance guidelines. Standards Australia has issued its handbook on corporate governance. Although not a business issue, the Australian government has also announced that it will introduce whistleblower protection legislation for the public sector by the end of its first term in office.  This legislation will likely influence whatever the private sector does in this respect. 
 




The evidence that whistleblowing is the most effective way to identify wrongdoing is seen in five separate studies, set out in later paragraphs. This information is of sufficient value to those who are working toward a strengthening of ethical practices for the research to be examined in some detail. 

First however it is necessary to define whistleblowing. The definition used in this paper is:

Whistleblowing is the exposure, by people within or from outside an organisation, of significant information on corruption and wrongdoing that is against the public interest, and that would not otherwise be available.

The definition is short, but the explanation of some of questions that whistleblowing raises requires a little more attention.  That the exposure is in the public interest is a key aspect of the definition. Typically, public interest issues are actions that endanger public health, safety, or the environment, or that raise anti-discrimination concerns or in other ways act against the public welfare. 

 An action that brings harm or has the potential to bring harm, directly or indirectly, to the public at large, now or in the future, is an action against the public interest.

Another definitional issue is whether the use of standard internal reporting systems to report a wrongdoing is whistleblowing. The answer is yes. As will be noted in several of the following paragraphs, such internal reporting channels are often termed whistleblowing hotlines.  The above definition requires an ‘exposure’ of the wrongdoing, in the anticipation that exposure to the relevant authorities or the community at large, will facilitate the wrongdoing being stopped. A major reason why people do not report wrongdoing is the belief that the wrongdoing will be covered up.  To avoid this concern, therefore, it will be argued that the whistleblower should be free to broaden the exposure to those able to bring pressure to bear on correcting the problem.   Even if the whistleblower reports internally, the organisation’s response should be made known, and if the whistleblower is not satisfied, s/he should be free to widen the exposure.

One final definitional concern is accusations of bullying, harassment, unprincipled conduct, etc., that are made against senior managers, and whether these are whistleblowing. There are many employees, both public sector and private, who suffer personal difficulties in the work place. They may have been bullied by their supervisor, they may believe that others were promoted unfairly ahead of them, or otherwise feel aggrieved with the organisation that they work for. They may complain of these personal problems.  The accusations may be completely valid; but they may also be only that one person’s view. Unless the complainant can bring evidence to show that several people suffer from this one supervisor, or evidence that the employer is contravening its own code of conduct, or even of breaking a law,  these complaints are just one person’s accusations, unless of course the accused admits the wrong. Until that evidence is available the complaints cannot be assumed to be in the public interest, and are therefore, not whistleblowing. Any company or public agencies will have, or should have, systems for identifying and dealing with these personal grievances.. 
 
The five studies that show whistleblowing is the most effective way of identifying wrongdoing in organisations are drawn from the private and public sectors, in Australia and overseas.  One of the more significant of these studies was undertaken for the Commonwealth public sector in Australia. This research demonstrated that senior managers and staff responsible for managing ethical behaviour in public agencies believe that whistleblowing is the most useful way to identify and stop wrongdoing. The research project comprised nine surveys across the public service, the largest of which sent out 23,177 questionnaires to public servants in 118 agencies, to which 7663 public servants responded. The research was organised by fourteen state and federal government ombudsman and anti-corruption agencies, along with five universities (Brown, AJ, 2008). 

The conclusion of the Australian research is backed up by a number of surveys conducted by the big accounting companies. A  survey sent in 2006 to 2,146 of Australia’s and New Zealand’s largest public and private sector organisations by KPMG found that 43% of wrongdoing is reported by employees or related parties, as opposed to being identified by internal controls (38%) and audits (7%)  (KPMG, 2006).  Its 2008 survey, however, found that internal controls were more effective (KPMG, 2008). Both studies equate whistleblowing, including anonymous whistleblowing” with the detection of fraud. KPMG stated in its opening summary that it “believes anonymous reporting systems are crucial to the detection of fraud, particularly when whistleblowers are concerned about retribution should their identity become known”. This author agrees with the KPMG statement.

PricewaterhouseCoopers’ 2009 survey on economic crime also found that whistleblowers were the highest source for identification of internal wrongdoing. Its 2009 survey, based on interviews in over 3,000 organisations in 54 countries, found that internal and external tip-offs identified 27% of fraud in organisations. With 7 % of the reporting coming from formal internal whistleblower systems, people willing to identify wrongdoing provided 34% of the total.   Internal audit provided 17%, and fraud risk management procedures 14%.  13% were discovered accidentally. Government enterprises were the most severely affected (PWC, 2009). 

Researchers at the Chicago School of Business and the University of Toronto drew up a "top ten" list of the most active fraud detectors. The study analysed 230 cases of alleged corporate fraud in U.S companies between 1996 and 2004. Topping the list of fraud detectors were employees (Dyck, Morse and Zingales, 2007). Finally, the Certified Fraud Examiners Association of the US, in their 2004 and 2006 annual conferences, presented evidence that internal whistleblowers were the dominant source of exposing fraud (Durant, 2004; CFEA, 2006).

The term fraud encompasses fraud by senior staff acting to benefit the company, as well as by individual employees within it acting in their own interests. The former is wrongdoing that is against the public interest. The latter includes employees using company resources for their own benefit, for example, theft, false expenditure claims, etc.  The studies cited above include both types of wrongdoing. The Dyck reference, for example, was an examination of large US companies that included Enron and Tyco, both of which acted against the public good.  The PWC survey is also mainly focussed on fraud against the organisation, although it does include bribery as an example of fraud. Its 2007 report also discusses the benefits of internal whistleblowing systems.  The KPMG survey has a similar emphasis on fraud against the organisation, such as internal theft, although again it discusses wrongdoing, at various managerial levels, that is not in the public interest. 

Whatever the type of wrongdoing, the results do indicate that a substantial number of people will expose dishonest actions in an organisation. Exposure of wrongdoing does not of course, automatically mean that it will cease. Any whistleblowing support system has also to ensure that the allegation will be investigated, and that, if found to be true, it will be stopped, and if a crime has been committed, the perpetrator will be punished.

The Australian public sector survey revealed that, despite whistleblowers being the most frequent source for identifying wrongdoing, many employees are reluctant to expose that information due to a belief that their information will not be acted on. They also fear the reprisals that might be inflicted on them. The Chicago and Toronto researchers also stated that European research by the accountancy firm Ernst & Young found that employees are fearful of the consequences of blowing the whistle. The reprisals against a whistleblower can be quite severe (See Johnston, 2006, Alford, 2004, De Maria, 1999). The legislation that has been or is being enacted worldwide is intended to overcome these barriers to whistleblowing. 

This paper examines the steps being taken to stop corporate wrongdoing in Australia through the steps underway to protect whistleblowers in the private sector. These steps are contained in the Corporations Act 2001, the only significant attempt in Australia to prevent retaliation against whistleblowers in business. The Act was extended in 2004 to provide this protection.  An examination of its effectiveness is currently underway, initiated by the Australian Treasury on the grounds that the 2004 whistleblower clauses have not been effective. A second reason behind the Treasury examination is to seek further responses to the ethical problems that arose during the recent Global Financial Crisis.

The whistleblower provisions of the Corporations are in Part 9.4AAA, enacted on 1 July 2004. The provisions apply to an employee or contractor of the company who reveals to the company or to official agencies that the company has breached a provision of the Corporations Act. The whistleblower must identify him/herself. The protections offered to the discloser (the term used in the Act) are that h/she will not be subject to any civil or criminal liability nor to the enforcement of a contractual or other agreement. The discloser also cannot be terminated on the basis that the disclosure constitutes a breach of contract. If the employee is dismissed, a court can order the employee be reinstated in their original position or a position at a comparable level. Victimisation is also prohibited. Any person who does so could be required to compensate the victim for the damage. The final section of the whistleblower provisions  places confidentiality requirements on the company, company officers, employees and auditors.

In announcing the inquiry, the covering letter from the Minister for Financial Services, Superannuation and Corporate Law, Chris Bowen MP, revealed that the government believes that the legislation has not been as effective as it could be. The Australian Securities and Investment Commission (ASIC), the responsible agency, had only used the protection clauses four times since their inception in 2004. “(P)oorly regarded and rarely used” was the Treasury description of the provisions in the Corporations Act. 

The Corporations and Financial Services Division of the Treasury announced the inquiry in October 2009. Submissions were requested by December that year. Twenty two submissions were received with 20 cleared for public release. Each submission was asked to respond to nine questions posed by the Treasury on optional ways to strengthen whistleblower protection. As will be seen, the nine questions did indicate that Treasury had a relatively narrow view of the extent of the reforms that might be necessary.  A number of respondents saw the issue of corporate wrongdoing to be much wider than the concerns raised by Treasury, and expanded their responses accordingly. 

This paper summarises the nine issues, but then expands the document to cover the additional issues raised by respondents. The paper draws the conclusion that unless the Treasury can extend its view of required reform, and incorporate those views in its recommendations, and have them accepted by the government, Australia is unlikely to see any significant diminution in corporate wrongdoing emerge from this exercise. Nor is it likely to develop administrative practices and the supporting legislation to match that of the two major English speaking countries – the US and the UK. 

This paper has the objective of building the knowledge of ethics practitioners and trainers on these current attempts to minimise unethical and illegal practices in the private sector. It also hopes to build support among these groups and with the general public, in efforts to improve the county’s ability to stop corporate wrongdoing. 

1. THE TREASURY QUESTIONS 

Nine questions are contained in the Treasury options paper (Treasury, 2009). 
Each of the 20 public responses received were documented in a Treasury release in February 2010 (Treasury, 2010) and are summarised in Table 1 below. The questions examine the whistleblower provisions of the Corporations Act, Part 9.4AAA. Responses came from three academics researching in this area, two of the larger Australian banks, nine professional associations, three companies providing whistleblowing services, one finance company and one law firm. Both of the last two had been involved in whistleblowing issues.  Telstra also provided a submission.    

The nine questions posed by the Commonwealth Treasury, were:  

A. Who can blow the whistle? 

The first option offered (A1) by Treasury was to extend the protections to cover former employees, independent financial services providers, or volunteers. This is a widening of the existing legislation, currently restricted to employees and contractors only. A second option (A2) was to extend protection to all members of the public. The majority of responses supported this A2 option, on the basis that any person who came into contact with the organisation could identify possible wrongdoing, and that wrongdoing would need to be investigated.  A supplier could identify a dishonest buyer, for instance. The supplier would need assistance, given that it is possible that in retribution for the public exposure, it might find that it is no longer asked to submit bids to the company. A further argument for extending protection to members of the public is that such an action would place the whistleblower’s information in an administrative and legislative system which would require an investigation of the alleged wrong. 

Among the minority responses, one did argue that independent financial services providers should be covered in separate legislation. Widening to all members of the public, by allowing aggrieved customers to blow the whistle, was also claimed to be difficult to administer.

The two submissions that advocated keeping the current practice (the third option offered - A3) tended to provide a conservative “no change” response on all issues.  One, a bank, argued that extending the coverage will not gain additional information as former employees will not be aware of current misdemeanours. The other, the finance company, voted the conservative position on all issues. The third company that provided predominately conservative, no change submissions, also a bank, did not respond to this question.

B. Should a subsidiary be covered?

The universal answer to this question was yes. The issue was whether an employee of a subsidiary who reveals wrongdoing should receive protection. The option that provided for extending the legislation to cover subsidiaries appears straightforward and uncontroversial and was affirmed as an appropriate reform by all respondents.

C. What issues can be disclosed?

This issue generated great differences of opinion. The Treasury discussion paper noted the anomalies in the current legislation, suggesting that there was “a clear need for the scope of protections to be expanded, at least to disclosures on any matter which ASIC can investigate”. Currently ASIC can only investigate disclosures where there is an infringement of the Corporations Act or its own Act.

The options offered by Treasury were that the whistleblower can report and gain protection on alleged illegal activities that ASIC can investigate (C1); or can report misconduct of a broader nature, but where the investigation would still be undertaken by ASIC (C2).  The finance company was the only vote for no change (C3). 

Legislative responses in the UK and US were outlined in the options paper. These practices are much wider than in Australia. In the British Act, the Public Interest Disclosures Act, 1998 (PIDA), qualifying disclosures are extensive and include any criminal offence, failure to comply with any legal obligation, miscarriage of justice and dangers to health, safety or the environment. In the US, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act confines itself to financial disclosures, but several other interlinked pieces of legislation widen the extent of whistleblower protections in the US. 

This issue is perhaps the most difficult of the whistleblowing options. It calls into question whether the whistleblower can reveal all types of wrongs, not just financial wrongs – wrongs such as despoiling the environment, or producing unsafe products, or the many employee or other abuses that are regularly encountered. These, however, are issues which ASIC cannot investigate. As a result, several submissions noted the need to extend the coverage of the legislation to provide stand-alone, general whistleblower protection rather than regulator or legislation-specific protection. Whistleblowers Australia (WBA) in a wide-ranging submission described the options as “...totally ineffective and dangerously inadequate …”   The need to stop a wide range of corporate wrongs is certainly more pressing than the options offered by Treasury, and possibly wider than ASIC’s legislated and administrative ability can handle. A whistleblower should be able to make a disclosure on corporate wrongdoing to any Commonwealth regulator or law enforcement agency. The options set out by Treasury require whistleblowers to know to which regulator a disclosure should be made, which is unrealistic. This issue is fundamental to handling private sector business wrongdoing in Australia, and is therefore, further and separately examined in Part 2 of this paper. 

D. Motives of the whistleblower? 

The question of the whistleblower’s motive has long been an issue in whistleblowing legislation. Good faith goes to the genuineness of the belief in the information being disclosed. Motive goes to the reasons for making the disclosure, but the two terms are often confused, with good faith taken to imply that the whistleblower should be driven by “pure“ motives  Treasury was querying if the good faith test should be abandoned.
 
Good faith, in the sense that the whistleblower should be motivated solely by  a desire to act in the public interest, does not attract universal support. For example, David Lewis (2008), in discussing the British approach to whistleblower protection, argues that the good faith requirement is unnecessarily restrictive. He argues that the”good faith” condition requires that the whistleblower cannot act from malice, or from any motive other than a desire to expose wrongdoing. 

A confused understanding of the difference between good faith and motive was noticeable in several submissions.  Chartered Secretaries Australia (CSA), however, stated that “good faith should go to the genuineness of the discloser’s belief in the information being disclosed and not the motives of the individual making the disclosure“. It noted that “if there is a genuine belief in the veracity of the information, despite any secondary motive held by the discloser, then protection should be available”. 
 
Very few of the submissions supported retaining the good faith requirement, perhaps due to this lack of clarity in its difference from motive. Nevertheless, the motive of the whistleblower was considered irrelevant by the majority of respondents; the key question being whether he or she is revealing a wrong doing, not why they were revealing it. Most therefore voted this option (D1).

The reasons behind the Australian Institute of Company Directors (AICD) submission for retaining the status quo (D2), were that the good faith requirement is “a useful mechanism for discouraging individuals from making vexatious or fabricated disclosures “. Other submissions, either in the submission itself or in the round table discussions that were hosted by Treasury subsequent to the submissions, also made the point that vexatious disclosures could waste considerable time in investigating the complaint. 





This is another controversial issue, which possibly hinges on the same concepts as the good faith requirement. Should whistleblowers be able to hide their identity, or should they be required to reveal themselves before their claims will be investigated? The current act requires the whistleblower to reveal their identity. 

The question of anonymity is not a simple issue. It is obvious that many disclosures – although certainly not all - will require additional information before they can be investigated. Without that information an anonymous disclosure could be a waste of time.  Yet with the current widespread belief that whistleblowers will be crucified, the desire to remain anonymous is obviously high. Those companies that supply whistleblowing services testified to this preference. On the other hand, accusations made against individuals obviously demand that they be accorded natural justice – including the right to defend themselves.

The majority of respondents preferred the anonymity option (E1) despite the limitations that it carried with it. Obviously a whistleblower who remained anonymous would not require protection. The need for protection was to cover the possibility that the whistleblower may come forward if it became apparent that the information had triggered steps to correct the problem.

 F. Court orders exposing identity?

The issue is whether a court could order the revealing of a whistleblower’s identity (Option F1) but that it first had to consider the impact of this order. Behind this issue is the concern that whistleblowers will be discouraged from coming forward if they believe that their identity may be revealed by a court order. The alternative (Option F2) was that a court cannot reveal identity unless the party wanting the information can establish that the release outweighs the public interest of keeping identity documents confidential. Option F3 was retaining the status quo in the legislation. Successive legal appeals have confirmed that courts currently will not release identity information. 

The preponderance of responses was that the F2 option was preferred. Maurice Blackburn (MB), a legal firm with some experience of this issue, argued against a lifting of restrictions, on the basis that common law immunity already provides sufficient protection for whistleblowers. Maurice Blackburn was the firm acting for the shareholders in a class action against Multiplex, the case cited in the Treasury options paper in which the identity of the whistleblower had already been revealed on an ABC 4 Corners program. 

G. Second-hand whistleblowing to be confidential?

A whistleblower reveals information to an official body, which may need to be passed on to a third party for investigative purposes. The question at issue here is whether that third party should also be bound to keep the information confidential, as well as the whistleblower’s identity or any information that is likely to lead to identifying the whistleblower. The universal response to this option was G1 – that the third party must also meet confidentiality requirements. Maurice Blackburn, however, pointed out that class action claimants against a company risk breaching contractual and statutory obligations of confidence, as does the lawyer who acts for them. They quoted several cases - GIO, the Vitamins cartel, and Aristocrat - arguing that protection should also be extended to the legal firm, for civil proceedings only.   

H. Should whistleblowers be protected if seeking legal advice?

The overwhelming response was affirmation of Option H1: whistleblowers should be protected if they seek legal advice. One dominant reason is the incomprehensibility of the Corporations Act to most people. “Unlovely and Unloved” is Cally Jordan’s description of the Act (2008).  Potential whistleblowers would need legal advice to determine whether a particular issue was covered by the legislation and also to know whether they would be protected. 

The question of ordinary employees understanding a wrong and determining whether they would be protected if they exposed an action brings into issue the administrative practices associated with whistleblowing. A number of responses encouraged the whistleblower to seek further assistance, through their unions, and through other public reform agencies. These steps may assist, but the issue at hand is more the need for regular employees to understand and be aware of the possibilities and the protections open to them, and the help they could be given by the agency handling the whistleblowing process.  





This question referred to internal whistleblowing systems, including commercial services such as Stopline, Deloitte’s and Your Call, asking whether the legislative protections helped encourage whistleblowers. No options were provided. The responses, from those who answered, were primarily negative - the legislation is ineffective.  

It should be noted that the US Sarbanes-Oxley Act mandates that an internal whistleblowing system be established.  









































This second part of the paper further explores five suggestions raised by the submissions that extend the options set out by the Treasury 

A.	Managing vexatious “whistleblowers”
B.	Wrongdoings that should be protected 
C.	Location and role of responsible agency 
D.	Protections for whistleblowers
E.	A False claims Act


A.	Managing vexatious or fraudulent “whistleblowers”

A number of submissions raised the problem that people with a grudge against their company, or against their supervisor, could raise false allegations that could have unwelcome consequences. Considerable embarrassment and the high cost of investigating an allegation that subsequently turned out to be false could be the result. 

The concern is entirely reasonable. Readers will be aware of the extensive literature on people who cause difficulties in organisations (e. g. Cava, 2004; Bernstein, 2001; Brinkman and Kirschner, 1994). Several submissions and the discussions in the subsequent round tables, however, provided answers for these concerns. One of the strongest was made by Whistleblowers Australia (WBA), the President of which stated that of those who come to WBA for assistance, some 60% were motivated by personal grievances, not by any public interest. They were, therefore, not whistleblowers. A figure of 50 - 60% is confirmed through other sources (Bowden, 2006). Determining whether the wrongdoing occurred or not is therefore the first line of inquiry. In most personal grievance cases, there is no public interest at work, and often no wrongdoing. If a wrongdoing did occur, the ‘whistleblower’ would need to produce evidence, before he/she could even be sufficiently convincing to trigger an investigation.  

The immediate response to this concern therefore is the need to question whether the wrongdoing is factual. All definitions of whistleblowing, including that implied by Treasury, involve a wrong – in this case a contravention of the Corporations Act. These paragraphs have argued for a widening of the concerns that a whistleblower can report, but in no case has it been argued that the accusation be other than a breaking of some existing law or code. Most frivolous accusations, therefore, can be weeded out quickly.

B.	Wrongdoing reports that should be protected

Several submissions argued that the protection for whistleblowers should extend to issues concerning damage to public health, safety, and the environment.  The Treasury options paper itself pointed out that the UK program extended to negligence, breach of contract, administrative law, miscarriage of justice as well as dangers to health, safety, and the environment. The Sarbanes Oxley Act in the US provides protection to whistleblowers who provide information on breaches of a range of federal statutes or regulations.  Whistleblower protection in the US is also provided in a number of other statutes covering health, safety, and the environment.  

The widening of the whistleblowing protections of Corporations Act beyond its current limitations appears a necessary step. This widening raises further issues, however. As the Treasury options paper points out, any extension using terms such as “misconduct” or “improper state of affairs” would be difficult for the general public to understand. They would also be issues that ASIC would be unlikely to have the experience or background staff to investigate. Nevertheless, it is readily apparent that whistleblowers who have inside knowledge should be able to bring to public attention any wrongdoing that companies perpetrate, and be protected from reprisals for disclosing this information.

An extension of the wrongs that can be reported also raises issues in relation to whom they would be reported, who would investigate the issues and how they would protect the whistleblower. In short, the role of the agency responsible for whistleblowing issues in the private sector is also an issue that has to be resolved.  

C. Location and role of responsible agency

Two of the submissions, both by academics, raised the issue that this question needed further research (Brown (2009) and Bowden (2009)).

The need for further research was derived from three underlying concerns.  One is that an extension of the wrongs that whistleblowers can safely report is obvious. But this extension raises the issues of what concerns could they report, to whom would they report and who manages the investigation and protection processes. ASIC is not the body to which breaches of all Commonwealth Acts should be reported. It does not have the legislative support for undertaking wide ranging investigations nor would it appear to have the experience to investigate them. 

ASIC acts through corporate law. The UK Act operates through employment law, with whistleblowers laying their concerns with their employer, or with designated regulatory bodies. If any negative action is taken against them, they appeal to an employment tribunal, and if their complaints are substantiated, compensation will be awarded through these tribunals. Under the US Sarbanes Oxley Act whistleblower complaints are filed with OSHA, the Occupational Safety and Health Administration of the US Department of Labor.  OSHA, under its Office of Whistleblower Protection, also administers the whistleblowing provisions of sixteen other statutes, protecting employees who report violations of various trucking, airline, nuclear power, pipeline, environmental, rail, consumer product and securities laws. This office investigates, makes a decision and if necessary reinstates or compensates whistleblowers who have suffered retribution.

The US and UK practices suggest that employment law, and the regulatory employment agencies, would be a preferred option to ASIC as the responsible agency. However, the Australian Government, in its recent response to whistleblower protection in the public sector, announced that employment law would not be adopted. This was its answer to the recommendations of the House Standing Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs investigating public sector whistleblowing protection (Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia, 2009)

The government’s decision is questionable.  The Workplace Ombudsman and associated agencies (Fair Work Australia from 2010) have a series of inspectors throughout the country who investigate breaches of the Fair Work Act. They have the ability to undertake investigations, and interact with and assist employees who report breaches of the existing labour legislation. This ability could extend to whistleblowers who report wider breaches of the law.   Research into the possibility of this option appears vital. 

The House Standing Committee, as did Treasury in developing its options, also drew on the massive research project into whistleblowing in the public sector (Brown, AJ, 2008). The leader of that study also advocated that whistleblowing protection in the private sector needed further research in Australia (Brown, 2009). 

One submission (Bowden, 2009) argued that any designated agency had an educational role as well as an investigative and whistleblower support role. It also had a data gathering and analysis role in presenting information on the effectiveness of its administrative procedures and the associated legislation. ASIC has done a poor job in this respect, which may be a contributing reason for the ineffectiveness of the legislation. ASIC in fact has rejected FOI requests for information for use by researchers, consultants and companies themselves.  It only became public knowledge that the legislation had not been useful when this information was revealed in the Minister’s letter requesting submissions. 

D. Protections for whistleblowers

The provisions in the current Act to protect whistleblowers are not extensive. The proposals from Treasury extend these protections a little, but not significantly.  Each state in Australia has a whistleblower protection Act for its public sector, although none of them are regarded as highly effective. Table 2 below compares the protections available in each of the State Acts with those currently available in the current Corporations Act and its likely extension under Treasury. There are ten protections available in the states. No state carries all ten. Only five of the possible ten protections are included in the Treasury options.
 
Perhaps the major protection to be sought is compensation for damages. Currently it is the principal method used in the UK, and a substantial part of the compensation system of OSHA under Sarbanes Oxley. This latter legislation “has two enforcement regimes--one civil, one criminal--to protect people who report on corporate fraud. The civil provision creates a right to reinstatement, back pay and damages for whistle-blowers. The criminal provision makes it a felony to retaliate against a protected whistle-blower” (Forbes Magazine, 2003). Additional protections, available in the Australian states but not proposed by Treasury, are the right to initiate proceedings for damages, the right to relocate, and the protection available through release to the media. 
PROTECTION	PUBLIC SECTOR [States]	PRIVATE SECTOR
	YES  -   is provided	NO  - not provided	Now/Likely revision
Confidentiality of whistleblower’s identity/info. 	All states and territories, on conditions		No/Yes(?)
Anonymous disclosures allowed?	Q, VIC, TAS, NT, and NSW by implication 	SA, ACT, WA	No/yes
Prohibition against reprisals. 	All states & territories 		Yes
Injunctions against reprisals under the act. 	VIC, Q. ACT , TAS, NT	NSW, WA, SA	No
Proceedings for damages. 	All states except NSW	NSW	No
Compensation	No states, except by court action		No
Right to relocate.	Q , ACT, (conditional)	VIC, TAS, NSW, WA, SA, NT	No
Indemnity against civil & criminal proceedings. 	All states 		Yes
Absolute privilege against defamation 	Q, ACT, VIC, NSW. TAS, NT 	SA, WA	Yes
Protection if released to media.	NSW , Conditional. 	No other state  permits release to media 	Not covered










F. False claims Act

There is little doubt that the most effective whistleblowing legislation worldwide is the US False Claims Act. Only one submission argued for it, that of Whistleblowers Australia (WBA); one also argued against it – the Rule of Law Association of Australia (ROLAA).  The False Claims Act operates through a whistleblower taking action on behalf of the government to recover funds siphoned off through false invoicing, shoddy goods, or through other forms of dishonesty and theft. The legislation has been responsible for the US government recovering a huge $ 22 billion in recent years (Taxpayers against Fraud, 2009). The whistleblower receives an average of some 15% of the funds recovered.  The largest False Claims case was Pfizer who paid in damages and fines a total of $2.3 billion, of which $1.3 billion was a criminal fine for kickbacks and off-label marketing. A range of drugs was involved, but mainly the drug Bextra.

The Australian attitude has been consistently set against a False Claims Act. Perhaps the argument is best exemplified by the ROLAA submission: “The question is what sort of society Australians want. Is it one where informing on your fellow worker, neighbour or employer for reward (financial or personal gratification) is encouraged?” 

An examination of the false claims outlined on the Taxpayers against Fraud website, however, will indicate that the fraudster is not “your fellow worker” or the next door neighbour. They are, for the most part, very large companies, often multinationals. US examples are numerous: Chevron, $45 Million for underpaying royalties; Novartis on criminal fraud charges and a $185 million fine related to the off-label promotion of the epilepsy drug Tripletail; the National Dental Management Company $24 million for performing medically unnecessary dental services on children insured by Medicaid; the University of Phoenix to pay $67.5 million to the U.S. Government, plus $11 million in private attorneys’ fees,  accused of violating the Dept. of Education rules prohibiting schools from accepting federal student financial aid while paying admissions counsellors cash incentives; Schering-Plough $69 Million on overpricing:  Johnson & Johnson “millions” on kickbacks ( still under investigation).





The current inquiry gives little confidence that a full ranging set of whistleblower protections will emerge from Treasury. It would seem likely that Treasury will confine itself to corporate issues as they apply under the Corporations Act, if for no other reason than this is within its limited area of responsibility. It does not have the political mandate to extend readily its operations into areas and functions under other departments of government. Hopefully, however, the widening of the inquiry suggested by some respondents will provide the impetus for further development of whistleblower protections in the private sector. Even the limited extension envisaged by Treasury, though insufficient, will possibly enable more wrongs to be identified than has the current legislation. 

Australia will nevertheless likely remain well behind its larger neighbours, the UK and the US, in efforts to stop corporate crime.
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